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ELECTRONIC PRIVACY AND EMPLOYEE SPEECH
PAULINE T. KIM*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of "privacy" has been invoked to protect a variety of dis-
tinct interests in the workplace, such as employees' interests in maintaining
their bodily integrity, avoiding intrusion on physical spaces, protecting
against the seizure of personal items, preventing disclosure of personal
information and ensuring individual autonomy.' Employees have asserted
the right to withhold certain types of sensitive information, or to avoid
intrusive scrutiny into private matters by their employers. Employers claim
an interest in knowing more about their employees and how they are spend-
ing their time in order to avoid liability and ensure productivity. The con-
flict between these competing interests has only sharpened with advancing
technology that has made it easier and cheaper for employers to monitor
and collect information about their employees.
Although technological change raises many different types of privacy
issues in the workplace, 2 this Essay focuses on a narrower set of interests-
* Charles Nagel Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. An earlier version of
this paper was presented as the Kenneth M. Piper lecture at the Chicago-Kent College of Law in April
2011. Special thanks to my colleagues Marion Crain and Neil Richards for conversations about these
issues over the years and for very helpful comments on this paper. Thanks also to Lauren Abbott, James
Ayden and William Osberghaus for research assistance.
1. See,e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (3rd ed. 2009) (cataloging
variety of employee interests under the concept of "privacy"). As many commentators have observed,
the concept of "privacy" is a capacious one, often invoked in a variety of seemingly unrelated situa-
tions. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
2. For example, advances in genetics mean that increasingly detailed information about an
individual's current health conditions and future medical risks can be gleaned from her genetic material,
raising questions about whether or when employers should be allowed to collect and use that infor-
mation. See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protec-
tions for a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497 (2002). Congress responded to those
challenges by passing the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 26, 29, and 42 of the U.S.
Code). Even if laws such as GINA prohibit employers from requesting certain types of sensitive infor-
mation, there is a risk that employees may come to feel pressure to self-disclose detailed personal
information in order to avoid negative inferences. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Per-
sonal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153 (2011).
Although these and other types of privacy issues may also be affected by the developments discussed in
this Essay, it focuses on employees' claims to electronic privacy because it is in this area that the impact
of the evolving workplace and changing technology is greatest, and that the connection with protected
employee speech interests is most significant.
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what I call electronic privacy-and its relationship to employee speech. By
"electronic privacy" I refer to employees' asserted interest in using various
forms of electronic media-email, cell phones, social networking sites, and
the internet-to communicate or to receive information free from employer
scrutiny. As the use of electronic devices has proliferated, employees' elec-
tronic communications have increasingly come under the scrutiny of their
employers, even when those communications are about purely personal
matters unrelated to work and even when those communications occur off
duty. Employers have retrieved and read highly personal communications
among intimates sent over work-provided equipment. 3 They have disci-
plined or fired workers because of comments they posted on Facebook, or
in private chat groups, even when the communications occurred off duty
using the employees' home computers. 4 In other cases, employers have
seized personal passwords or used forensic techniques to access email ex-
changed on employees' personal email accounts.5
As these and other incidents suggest, the norms surrounding whether
or when employees can expect privacy in their communications are highly
uncertain. The traditional approach of protecting purely personal matters,
while allowing employer scrutiny of work-related activities is proving un-
workable. Changes in the organization of work and changes in technology
are increasingly blurring the boundary between professional and private
life.6 At the same time, technological advances are making it easier for
employers to capture ever more detailed and comprehensive information
3. See, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
4. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (12-31), Jan. 24, 2012 (updating earlier report by describing additional cases
concerning employees' use of social media and employers' social medial policies and rules); NAT'L
LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA
CASES (11-74), Aug. 18, 2011 (describing recent claims of interference with protected rights based on
employees' use of social media and Board responses). See also Melanie Trottman, Workers Claim Right
to Rant on Facebook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2011, at BI (explaining that more than 100 charges have
been filed with the NLRB by employees alleging that they were terminated because of their communi-
cations on social media sites).
5. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Pietrylo v. Hillstone
Rest. Group, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009); Curto v. Med. World
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006); Fischer
v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
6. See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries:
Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. Bus. L. J. 63, 64 (2012); Ariana
R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for the
Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REv. 461 (2012); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the
Social Networks: Blurring the Line between Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REv. 1 (2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-1773049; Robert Sprague,
Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-evolution for Ameri-
can Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83 (2008).
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about their employees' communications and activities on and off duty.7
Current privacy law doctrine is ill-equipped to address these developments
and, as a result, many commentators have argued that employee privacy is
insufficiently protected in the electronic workplace.8
The extent to which the law should intervene in the employment rela-
tionship to protect employee privacy is highly contested. However, advo-
cates on both sides of the debate have largely overlooked a significant
related development-namely, the extent to which the law protects certain
socially valuable forms of employee speech. Although the law does not
generally guarantee free speech for employees in the workplace, it does
carve out special areas of protection. Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, for example, protects workers' rights to speak collectively, guar-
anteeing the right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual
aid or protection. 9 In addition, as the law has stepped in to regulate the
workplace in various ways, it has also extended protection to employees
who speak up to enforce those laws. For example, Title VII not only for-
bids employment discrimination, it also prohibits employers from retaliat-
ing against an employee who complains about discrimination.' 0 Other legal
developments reflect the belief that employees have a critical role to play in
exposing public corruption and corporate wrong-doing. Courts and legisla-
tures have increasingly extended protections to whistleblowers who report
illegal or unethical conduct by their employers,"I most recently in an effort
to deter corporate wrongdoing that has undermined confidence in the fi-
nancial system.12
7. See, e.g., Dennis R. Nolan, Privacy and Profitability in the Technological Workplace, 24 J. OF
LAB. RES. 207 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Abril, et al., supra note 6, at 95; William A. Herbert. The Electronic Workplace: To
Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest, 12 EMP. RTS. AND EMP. POL'Y J. 49 (2008); Nolan, supra
note 7; Sprague, supra note 6.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
11. As state courts began to recognize the common law claim of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy, some extended it to protect employees fired for whistleblowing activities, particularly
when public health or safety was involved. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669, 671
(10th Cir. 1990); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th Cir. 1984); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, 700 S.W.2d 859, 878
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In other states, the legislature stepped in to protect certain types of employees for
certain types of whistleblowing speech. For a comprehensive overview of statutory whistleblower
protections, see DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITr, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009).
12. Congress extended whistleblower protections to some private sector employees in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006) and further expanded these protections in the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. See Tammy Marzigliano & Cara E. Greene, The Dodd-Frank Act's Whistle-
blower Provisions: The Act's Best Hope for Exposing Financial Wrongdoing, 8 WORKPLACE L. REP.
1507 (2010) (explaining that whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank Act attempt to address the short-
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These two developments-weak protection for employee's electronic
privacy and increased protection for some socially valued forms of em-
ployee speech-are at odds because privacy and speech are closely con-
nected. Although the law has often assumed that privacy and speech rights
exist in tension with one another,13 scholars have recently pointed out that
these values are in many ways consistent, even mutually reinforcing. 14
They argue that some forms of privacy protection promote speech values
by granting individuals space to explore and test new ideas, and to associ-
ate with like-minded others-activities that are often precursors to speech
that is valuable in the public sphere.15 In the context of the workplace, the-
se insights suggest that socially valued forms of speech may be less likely
to be produced without some privacy for employees to explore ideas and
communicate with others. Ironically, then, the law is simultaneously ex-
pecting more from employee speech and protecting employee privacy less,
even though some measure of privacy protection may be necessary to sup-
port speech.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses how protection of
employee privacy under current law rests on a distinction between personal
and work-related matters, and explores the ways in which changes in the
organization of work and changes in technology are blurring that boundary.
Part II briefly surveys the limitations of existing law in protecting employ-
ee privacy given these developments. In Part III, I turn to a consideration of
employee speech interests, exploring how the law currently recognizes and
protects certain socially valued forms of employee speech-namely, collec-
tive speech, and speech necessary to enforce workplace regulation and to
report and deter corporate wrong-doing. The connection between these
protected forms of employee speech and employees' interest in privacy is
explored in Part IV. Drawing on theories about the importance of privacy
in fostering speech and participation in public discourse, I argue that some
comings of the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to broaden the application of
those protections).
13. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected privacy claims based on the First
Amendment rights of the speaker to publish arguably private information. See, e.g., Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527-30 (2001) (holding that disclosures by media of illegally intercepted com-
munications on matters of public concern are protected by First Amendment); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g, 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 396-97 (1967). Cf Cohen v.
Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that First Amendment does not bar promissory
estoppel claim against newspaper for revealing identity of a source promised confidentiality).
14. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1373 (2000); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REv. 387 (2008);
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609 (1999); Sean M.
Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values ofPrivacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 14, at 403-04.
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measure of workplace privacy is necessary to encourage socially valued
forms of employee speech. The last Part concludes.
I. BLURRING BOUNDARIES
A. Distinguishing the Personal and the Professional
Although the relevant doctrine for analyzing employee claims of inva-
sion of privacy by their employers depends upon the type of intrusion and
the type of workplace,' 6 as a general matter, the law roughly tries to distin-
guish personal from work-related matters. Public employees receive some
protection for personal privacy from the Constitution, particularly the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 17 This inquiry has been framed in terms of whether an employee has
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the matter intruded upon. The
leading case, O'Connor v. Ortega,'8 considered the claims of a public em-
ployee that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his employer
searched his office, desk and file cabinets. Although the Supreme Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment restrains government employers, it
held that its prohibitions apply only if the employer's actions "infringe[]
'an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble."l 9 According to a plurality of the Court, the goal is to distinguish "the
workplace context"-that is, "those areas and items that are related to work
and are generally within the employer's control," 20-from personal matters
not part of that context-for example, the contents of closed luggage or a
16. In addition to the constitutional and common law doctrines discussed in the text, a variety of
state and federal statutes protect against specific types of privacy invasions and many of these turn on
the type of workplace as well as the type of intrusion. For a comprehensive list of statutes regulating
privacy interests in employment, see FINKIN, supra note 1, at 615-971. These statutes vary considerably
in the extent to which they protect employee privacy, and in many instances, the interests protected are
quite narrow. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s (West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination
against employees who smoke or use tobacco outside the workplace and off duty). Nevertheless, they
reflect legislative judgments about which matters are sufficiently personal to the employee that they
should not be subject to employer scrutiny.
17. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding that the Fourth Amendment constrains
government employers). Some lower federal courts have also found the constitutional interest "in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" that derives from the Fourteenth Amendment, Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), to apply in the employment setting. See, e.g., Denius v. Dunlap, 209
F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court recently rejected such a privacy claim brought by employees of a government
contractor. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). In doing so, it "assume[d], without deciding" that
such a privacy right is protected by the Constitution, but concluded that the background check chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs did not violate that right. Id. at 751.
18. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
19. Id. at 715.
20. Id. at 715.
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purse brought to work by an employee. 21 The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test was thus intended to delineate legitimate employee claims of
privacy by distinguishing the personal from the work-related.
Determining that a public employee has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in a matter intruded upon "is only to begin the inquiry." 22 The
plurality in O'Connor found that determining the reasonableness of a
workplace search under the Fourth Amendment requires "balanc[ing] the
invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy against the
government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of
the workplace." 23 Given the "realities of the workplace," the Court con-
cluded that a workplace search did not require a warrant and probable
cause to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Rather, workplace searches
"should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circum-
stances," taking into account whether the intrusion was "justified at its
inception" and was "reasonably related in scope" to the initial justifica-
tion.24
Employees in the private sector generally cannot rely on constitutional
rights to protect against employer intrusion.25 Instead, these employees
have invoked common law privacy torts to redress perceived violations of
their privacy rights. 26 The common law tort most relevant to the employ-
21. Id. at 716. Justice Scalia agreed that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures
by government employers, but disagreed with the plurality's open-ended, contextual inquiry for deter-
mining whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the workplace. Id. at 729-30 (Scal-
ia, J., concurring). He would have held that government employees' offices and their contents are
covered by the Fourth Amendment, but that the employment relationship is significant for determining
whether a given search is "reasonable." Id. at 73 1.
22. Id. at 719 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
23. Id. at 719-20.
24. Id. at 725-26 (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
25. Although private sector employees generally cannot rely on constitutional provisions as a
source of privacy protections, courts in a few states have allowed them to invoke state constitutional
provisions. The California Supreme Court, for example, has held that the state's constitutional guaran-
tee of individual privacy directly applies to both public and private actors-including private employ-
ers. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). In Alaska, the constitutional right
to privacy applies only to state action; however, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to the constitutional
privacy guarantee, along with other sources of law, to conclude that public policy protects certain
spheres of employee conduct from employer intrusion even in the private sector. Luedtke v. Nabors
Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
26. In a unionized workplace, employees may have additional protections, depending upon the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Such agreements generally restrict employers' right to
discipline or discharge employees without just cause. Because a just cause standard requires the em-
ployer to have reasons connected to the work or the workplace for its actions, see Roger 1. Abrams &
Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L. J.
594, 611-12 (1985), it protects employees' privacy indirectly to the extent that it limits the employer's
ability to take disciplinary action based on personal information or activities that are not job related. In
addition, employers may be required to bargain with a union before initiating privacy-intrusive practic-
es such as workplace monitoring of employees. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Local 15, International
906 [Vol 87:3
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ment setting establishes liability for an intentional intrusion "upon the soli-
tude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns" that is "high-
ly offensive to a reasonable person."27 Although cases decided under the
Constitution are not binding precedent, many courts have borrowed lan-
guage from those cases, asking whether the plaintiff had a "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" as part of its analysis of the invasion of privacy tort
claim. For example, in K-Mart Corporation v. Trotti, the Court of Appeals
of Texas concluded that an employee who placed a personal lock on a
locker at her worksite had "demonstrated a legitimate expectation to a right
of privacy in both the locker itself and those personal effects within it."28
Conversely, in O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, the Northern District of Iowa
concluded that an employee lacked a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
that his desk and office area would not be searched for work-related docu-
ments. 29
As in the constitutional cases, this inquiry serves roughly to separate
personal matters from areas of legitimate employer concern. Even at the
workplace, the law limits searches of personal effectS30 and shields em-
ployees from observation in traditionally private spaces such as a restroom
or dressing room. 31 Similarly, the common law tort protects employees'
privacy in traditionally secluded off duty locations such as a home 32 or
hotel room.33 On the other hand, the more closely the matter intruded upon
is connected to work or the workplace, the less likely an actionable inva-
sion of privacy will be found. As examples, courts have found no invasion
Chem. Workers Union., 323 N.L.R.B. 515 (1997). On the other hand, the union grievance process tends
to focus on job security, rather than dignitary harms caused by invasions of privacy. See Pauline T.
Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy. The Experience With
Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. REv. 1009, 1019-22, 1029 (2006).
27. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). Although the common law tort offers some
protection of employee privacy interests, its application in the workplace context is complicated by the
fact that most private sector employees are employed at will, making it difficult for them to object to
perceived invasions of privacy without risking discharge. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public
Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 671 (1996).
28. 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ct. App. Tex.1984).
29. 868 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
30. See, e.g., K-Mart, 677 S.W.2d at 632 (remanding for consideration of plaintiffs claim that her
employer invaded her privacy when it opened her locker and searched her purse).
31. See, e.g., Johnson v. Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. App. 2005) (rejecting summary judgment for
employer on invasion of privacy claim alleging installation and monitoring of video camera in women's
restroom); Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publ'n, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 424 (S.D. 1994) (upholding jury verdict
for plaintiffs on invasion of privacy claim based on employer's surreptitious observation of employees
in bathroom).
32. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634, 648-49 (Ark. 2002) (upholding jury verdict
for employee for invasion of privacy based on employer's search of his home for allegedly stolen
merchandise).
33. See, e.g., Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 474-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (affirming
jury finding that employer invaded employee's right to privacy by searching motel room).
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of privacy when employers have searched for work-related documents in
an employee's office and desk 34 or for contraband in an employee's car
parked on the employer's premises.35 Thus, even though framed in terms of
a "highly offensive intrusion," the common law privacy tort, like privacy
protections under the Constitution, purports to distinguish personal from
work-related matters.
Scholars have long criticized constitutional and common law doctrines
as insufficiently protective of employee privacy.36 Some have criticized the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test to the extent that it looks to em-
ployer policies and practices, rather than existing social norms to determine
"reasonableness." 37 Such an approach permits employers to destroy any
expectations of privacy simply by announcing privacy-invading practices
in advance, and regularly carrying them out.38 The common law privacy
tort similarly turns on business practices, and courts have relied on the
existence of a business justification to reduce an employee's expectation of
privacy or render the intrusion inoffensive. Professor Matthew Finkin as-
serts that this analytical structure "reduces the idea of a common law pro-
tective of employee privacy to an irrelevance insofar as systematically
invasive action is taken in the name of what management perceives as a
greater business good." 39 Whether or not the law adequately protects tradi-
tional concerns like bodily or spatial privacy, it has proven quite anemic
when confronted with employees' claims to privacy in their electronic
communications, as discussed in Part II, infra.
B. Changes in the Organization of Work
Recent developments in the organization of work have contributed to
a blurring of the boundary between personal and professional identities. Of
course, work and private life have never been entirely distinct. Over time
and across workplaces, there has been great variation in the extent to which
personal and work lives overlapped or were rigidly compartmentalized.
34. O'Bryan, 868 F. Supp. atl 146 (granting summary judgment for employer on employee's
invasion of privacy claim based on a search of his desk and office area).
35. Terrell v. Rowsey, 647 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no wrongful invasion of
privacy when employer searched employee's car on suspicion he was drinking beer during a work
break).
36. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 221 (1996) [hereinafter Finkin, Employee Privacy]; Kim, supra note 27; Don Mayer,
Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 AM. Bus. L.J.
625 (1992).
37. See,e.g., Mayer, supra note 36, at 643-45.
38. See Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 36, at 226.
39. Id. at 240.
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Under traditional common law rules, for example, the master-servant rela-
tionship entailed not merely an economic exchange, but a personal relation-
ship with obligations and duties as well. 40 Often, the work relationship was
also a domestic one, with the servant residing with the master.41 In the mid-
twentieth century, however, the modem organization of work clearly sepa-
rated home and paid work. The protection of employee privacy was one
means of policing that boundary.42
In recent decades, changes in the organization of work have once
again blurred that boundary. These changes have received considerable
attention-firms are abandoning the internal labor market model, lifetime
jobs are rare, employees change jobs frequently and employers no longer
encourage expectations of job security.43 The breakdown of career em-
ployment means that employer and employee interests are no longer as
clearly aligned over the long term. Employers that no longer hold out the
prospect of lifetime employment cannot rely on traditional policies, such as
the promise of pensions and retiree health care benefits to align their work-
ers' long term interests with their own.44
Unwilling to promise long term job security, firms now encourage
employees to develop affective ties to the workplace to induce employee
loyalty.45 When sociologist Arlie Hochschild began an in-depth study of
the challenges faced by working parents, she "assumed that home was
'home' and work was 'work."' 46 What she discovered instead was that for
some employees, these worlds are becoming reversed. Particularly for
working parents, home may be experienced as a place of obligation, stress
and conflict, while work can be a site of affirmation, positive social interac-
tions and strong emotional ties. Employers often deliberately cultivate the-
se feelings, referring to the company as "family," encouraging social bonds
among employees and inculcating firm values-all intended to foster emo-
tional attachment and increased loyalty to the firm. Similarly, Marion Crain
has documented employer efforts to ensure worker loyalty by inducing
40. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 11-14 (1983)
(depicting the household model of master-servant law, with defined expectations and obligations).
41. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 123 (1976) (describing the master servant relation as personal, often familial).
42. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 197-200 (1969).
43. See, e.g., PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN
WORKFORCE (1999); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATIONS FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004).
44. Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REv. 1179,
1192-95 (2010).
45. Id. at 1197-98.
46. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME
BECOMES WORK (1997).
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employees to identify with the company brand. As she writes, such efforts
"aim[] to induce employees to view their employment as a personal rela-
tionship akin to a family tie, imbuing the economic transaction with emo-
tional significance." 47
The changing demographics of the labor force have further contribut-
ed to blurring the boundary between home and work. The traditional family
model with clearly delineated roles of breadwinner and homemaker permit-
ted a clean separation of work and home life. Men were free to focus on
market work, while women performed care work in spaces physically sepa-
rate from the paid workplace. In recent years, the influx of women, particu-
larly women with children, into the workplace has disrupted this traditional
model. Strict compartmentalization of work and home is no longer possible
for the increasing number of dual-earner and single-parent families. Today,
both men and women have multiple, significant roles-worker, partner,
parent-putting pressure on employers to accommodate workers' family
obligations through benefits such as flex time, on-site daycare, and tele-
commuting. While these types of policies may help employees balance
work and family obligations, a side effect is that work and home are more
difficult to separate, with home life and personal matters inevitably seeping
into the workplace, while work activities often extend into the home. As a
result, the boundary between home and work has become increasingly un-
stable and difficult to police.
C. Changes in Technology
The advent of the electronic workplace is also making it more difficult
to separate work and home. Even before the rise of electronic communica-
tions, the line was not always a clear one. Dissenting in O'Connor v. Orte-
ga nearly a quarter century ago, Justice Blackmun noted that long working
hours meant that "the workplace has become another home for most work-
ing Americans." 48 Inevitably, employees might sometimes need to make
personal calls or attend to personal business during breaks at work. "As a
result," he argued, "the tidy distinctions . . . between the workplace and
professional affairs, on the one hand, aud personal possessions and private
activities, on the other, do not exist in reality."49 Justice Blackman thus
rejected the plurality's suggestion that an employee could protect personal
47. Crain, supra note 44, at 1179.
48. 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Id
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belongings "by simply leaving them at home" as insensitive to the "opera-
tional realities of the workplace."SO
The difficulty of neatly compartmentalizing home and work has been
exacerbated by technological change. In an earlier era, an employee might
have used an office telephone to make a personal call during a break. Alt-
hough phone calls could be recorded, phone systems in most workplaces
were not routinely configured to constantly record conversations. Work-
place norms generally permitted limited private use of an employer's phone
system, and some employers provided separate phone lines for employees'
personal use. 51 In addition, the law restricted the employer's ability to cap-
ture purely personal phone calls. 52 Today, an employee might use a work
computer during a break to check a website for information regarding a
medical condition or send an email to a spouse or lover. Information about
these online activities is automatically stored and can be systematically
tracked or retrieved and reviewed long after the fact.
Given the ubiquity of electronic communications in both business and
social life, it is unrealistic to expect that employees will never use employ-
er-provided systems to communicate about personal matters.53 In order to
keep personal life entirely out of the workplace, an employee would have
to consciously segregate any non-work related information, engaging in
constant self-monitoring of how, when and with whom she communicates.
If it were necessary to engage in the occasional bit of personal business
during a break or lunch hour, the employee would not only need to main-
tain a personal email account, she would also need to bring a personal
smartphone or computer to work-one that did not access the internet
through her employer's server. She would need to take care that her per-
sonal and work calendars, contacts and other electronically stored data
50. Id. at 740.
51. See, e.g., Watkins v. L. M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 579 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing
employer policy of permitting personal calls on company phones); Jandak v. Vill. of Brookfield, 520 F.
Supp. 815, 824-25 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (describing workplace with 10 phone lines, nine of which were
continuously taped and one of which was unmonitored and provided expressly for personal use).
52. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming award of damages under Title III
of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to employee whose personal phone calls were
surreptitiously recorded by employer); Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583 (interpreting Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to permit interception of a personal call to determine
whether it was a business or personal call, but not to learn its contents).
53. In City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), a police officer alleged his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when his employer reviewed transcripts of messages sent on his work
pager. Although the pagers were intended to coordinate the activities of SWAT team members, Quon
had sent numerous private messages, many of which were sent to intimates and were sexually explicit
in nature. The facts in Quon are notable for the sheer number of personal texts sent on work time (near-
ly 400 in a one month period) and their highly personal nature; however, occasional employee use of
employer-provided equipment for personal communications is a much broader phenomenon.
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were stored separately and accessed on separate devices. Even with such
assiduous efforts, the employee is unlikely to succeed entirely in preventing
personal matters from seeping into the workplace. A friend or family mem-
ber might send communications containing personal information to an em-
ployee at work without her consent, and an employer may be able to infer
personal information simply by knowing to whom an employee is related
and with whom she associates. 54
Advances in technology have also allowed work to extend far beyond
the workplace. In an effort to increase flexibility and efficiency, employers
provide smartphones, laptop computers and pagers, so that employees can
work at home or while travelling. These devices permit work to intrude into
previously private spaces, and into times traditionally considered beyond
the bounds of the workday, further blurring the boundaries of the work
environment. The co-mingling of work and private life in time and space
makes it more difficult for employees to determine when their activities
might be subject to employer scrutiny and control. For example, in a recent
case, an employee used an employer provided laptop to review and send
several emails to her attorney regarding a possible discrimination claim
against the employer. 55 She did so off-premises during nonworking hours
using a personal, password-protected Yahoo account, believing that her
communications would thereby remain confidential. Nevertheless, the em-
ployer was able to recover copies of the emails from the computer's hard
drive after she had returned it.
Even off duty activities that take place completely outside the work
environment may have repercussions at work. With the growth of infor-
mation technologies, more and more individuals are active participants in
blogs, online fora and social media sites, increasing the likelihood that their
employers will become aware of their off duty communications and activi-
ties. Even when employees use their own computers or personal
smartphones to access these sites, their employers may learn of their online
activities. News stories have reported numerous instances of employees
54. For example, because many diseases have a genetic basis, genetic information about an indi-
vidual may be revealed simply by knowing about the health condition of a close blood relative. Mark
MacCarthy discusses other types of "privacy extemalities"-situations in which information revealed
by others about themselves can indirectly reveal information about another individual who has not
chosen to reveal that information. Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy, available at
http://works.bepress.com/markmaccarthy/2 (2010). For example, as knowledge of networks grows,
researchers can often infer health and behavioral characteristics about an individual simply by knowing
about that person's associates.
55. Stengartv. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
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terminated because of their blog posts, 56 and members of Facebook groups,
such as "Have You Been Fired Because of Facebook?" share stories about
losing their jobs because of their communications on social media. In re-
cent months, the National Labor Relations Board has received over a hun-
dred complaints from employees terminated or disciplined because of their
use of social media-in most cases, while off duty.57
While employers have always had an interest in monitoring their em-
ployees' activities, technological change has increased both the incentives
and means to do so. In addition to concerns about productivity and abuse of
property that traditionally motivated employer surveillance, employers now
also fear that employee misuse of electronic communications will increase
their liability risks-for example, by giving rise to charges of racial or sex-
ual harassment, or subjecting the employer to claims of fraud, defamation
or copyright infringement. Employee mishandling of electronic files could
also result in improper disclosure of customers' private information or oth-
er security breaches, or risk the disclosure of trade secrets or other valuable
business information, either intentionally or inadvertently. And when an
individual is identifiable as an employee, even her off duty activities, when
amplified by the internet, have the potential to cause harm to a firm's pub-
lic image.58
At the same time, technological advances are making it easier and
cheaper for employers to monitor their employees' electronic activities, and
employers are increasingly engaging in such monitoring. A recent survey
of over 300 firms found that 43% of the respondents monitored their em-
ployees' email, 66% monitor website connections and 45% track computer
56. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Warning: your clever little blog could get you fired, USA TODAY
(June 15, 2005, 10:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-06-14-worker-blogs-
usat_x.htm; Fired for Blogging, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:33 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/07/tech/main678554.shtml.
57. See Melanie Trottman, Workers Claim Right to Rant on Facebook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2011,
at BI (explaining that more than 100 charges have been filed with the NLRB by employees alleging
that they were terminated because of their communications on social media sites); NAT'L LABOR
RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (12-
31), Jan. 24, 2012 (updating earlier report by describing additional cases concerning employees' use of
social media and employers' social medial policies and rules); NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT
OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (11-74), Aug. 18, 2011
(describing recent claims of interference with protected rights based on employees' use of social media
and Board responses).
58. A notable example is the video produced by several Domino's Pizza employees as a joke, in
which they purported to prepare food for customers in a highly unsanitary manner. Their attempt at
humor went awry when the video went viral on Youtube, harming Domino's reputation and resulting in
their termination. See Stephanie Clifford, Video Prank at Domino's Taints Brand, N. Y. TIMES, April
15, 2009, at Bl.
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use by monitoring time spent, content or keystrokes entered.59 Although
the survey focused on workplace monitoring, anecdotal reports suggest that
at least some employers are seeking to monitor their employees' online
activities off the job as well. Some have reportedly required current or pro-
spective employees to provide their usernames and passwords for Facebook
or private chat groups. 60 In addition, software is now available that em-
ployers can use to automatically monitor their employees' activities on
social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln. 61
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY LAW
The current law of privacy is not well equipped to address these de-
velopments in the workplace. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"),62 which prohibits the interception of electronic communications
and unauthorized access to stored communications, would appear to limit
employers' ability to access and monitor private employee communica-
tions, and it has on occasion provided redress to employees for employer
intrusions into their off duty activities. 63 The prohibitions contained in the
ECPA, however, are subject to a number of exceptions-for example,
when there is consent to the interception, 64 or when the communication is
accessed by the provider of the electronic communications service. 65 Be-
59. American Management Association & The ePolicy Institute, 2007 Electronic Monitoring &
Surveillance Survey (Feb. 28, 2008), http://press.amanet.org/press-releases/177/2007-electronic-
monitoring-surveillance-survey/.
60. See, e.g., Abril, et al., supra note 6, at 102 (noting that some survey respondents reported
being required to give employers access to their online social media profiles); Alexis Madrigal, Should
Employers Be Allowed to Ask for Your Facebook Login?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2011, 10:54 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/should-employers-be-allowed-to-ask-for-your-
facebook-login/71480/; Declan McCullagh, Want a Job? Hand Over Your E-Mail Login, CBSNEWS
(June 19, 2009, 1:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/18/national/main5096450.shtml.
61. Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees' Social Networking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2010, 6:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/keeping-a-closer-eye-on-workers-social-
networking/.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). The EPCA has two parts that are potentially relevant to the employ-
ment relationship. Title 1, sometimes referred to as the Wiretap Act, prohibits the interception of elec-
tronic communications. Title II contains the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which creates civil
liability for intentional access without authorization of "a facility through which an electronic commu-
nication service is provided" or which "intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility." 18
U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006).
63. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing summary
judgment on SCA claim for employer who accessed employee's password protected website, given
dispute whether it obtained access through an authorized user); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No.
06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (refusing to set aside jury verdict finding
that employer violated the SCA when it accessed plaintiffs' private chat group on MySpace); Fischer v.
Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (denying summary judgment
on SCA claim to employer who accessed plaintiff's web-based Hotmail account).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006).
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cause employees may be deemed to have consented to surveillance, and
employers are often the providers of electronic communications systems
such as email, the Act's protections have been found inapplicable in a
number of workplace cases. 66 Although the ECPA could be interpreted in
ways more protective of employee privacy, 67 under current interpretations
it provides rather weak protection against employer scrutiny of employees'
electronic communications. 68
Given the uncertain protections of the ECPA, employees have also as-
serted privacy rights under constitutional and common law doctrines. As
discussed in Part I. A., supra, the analysis under either framework begins
with the threshold question whether an employee has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. This test has been criticized on a number of grounds,69 but
it is particularly unhelpful in analyzing new technologies. In the Fourth
Amendment context, courts look to such factors as "the intention of the
Framers" and "societal understanding" to determine whether an expectation
of privacy is reasonable. 70 These inquiries offer little help, however, when
considering new technologies for which no historical consensus or estab-
lished societal understanding exists. Precisely because their role in society
and the norms governing their use are contested and evolving, no existing
"societal understanding" can determine which expectations of privacy are
fundamental enough to warrant protection.
In the absence of established societal understandings, many courts
considering employees' claims of electronic privacy have resorted to me-
chanical forms of reasoning. Thus, some have concluded that the employ-
er's ownership of the computer system or the fact that it is technologically
possible for a message to be intercepted negates any reasonable expectation
66. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding no viola-
tion of Title II of ECPA because employer was provider of the service); Sporer v. UAL Corp., No. C
08-02835 JSW, 2009 WL 2761329 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (finding ECPA exception applies where
employee had impliedly consented to monitoring of his work email); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.
Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996) (same).
67. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 6.
68. See Ariana R. Levinson, Workplace Privacy and Monitoring: The Quest for Balanced Inter-
ests, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (2011). A number of states have enacted statutory protections analogous
to the federal ECPA and in some cases, these statutes have narrower exceptions. Nevertheless, these
state laws have generally not provided any significant protection in the employment context.
69. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 72-73 (discussing the difficulties in determining how
reasonable expectations of privacy are to be determined); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974) (arguing that government can destroy 'reasona-
ble expectation of privacy' merely by announcing that it will conduct comprehensive surveillance);
Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.
173, 188 (1979) (asserting that "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is circular because expectations
will depend upon the legal rule).
70. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
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of privacy.71 Property ownership and technological feasibility, however,
are not decisive in determining whether an expectation of privacy is rea-
sonable. 72 As Professors Bellia and Freiwald have argued, the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test should entail "normative rather than merely
positive analysis." 73 In other words, the role of courts should be to "ask
what society is entitled to believe," not merely whether a given form of
communication is potentially vulnerable to interception. 74 When the Su-
preme Court in Katz v. United States75 held that individuals have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their telephone conversations, the public was
well aware of the possibility of wiretapping. Nonetheless, the Court pro-
tected these conversations because of "the vital role that the public tele-
phone has come to play in private communication." 76
Thus, courts could work to discern when new forms of monitoring
implicate fundamental interests that warrant recognition and protection;
however, for the most part they have declined to do so in the employment
context. For example, the Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon77 re-
cently confronted whether a public employee had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in personal texts sent on an employer provided pager, but de-
clined to decide the question because of uncertainty about "how workplace
norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve" given "[r]apid chang-
71. See, e.g., Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting employee
claim of privacy in files stored on laptop computer in part because the laptop was owned by employer);
Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1234 (finding expectation of privacy not objective reasonable given that re-
cording and storing of pager messages are "an integral part of the technology"); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,
914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding employee did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages sent over company owned e-mail system); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-
CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999) (noting that email messages were stored on a compa-
ny-owned computer and were accessible when transmitted in rejecting employee claim of privacy in
email).
72. See, e.g., O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 740 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This Court ... has made
it clear that privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment do not turn on ownership of particular
premises), (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); U. S. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286-87
(6th Cir. 2010) ("The mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the content of a communica-
tion cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy.") (emphasis in original);
Schowergerdt v. General Dynamics, 823 F.2d 1328, 1233 ("Fourth Amendment privacy interests do not
... turn on property interests."). Cf Watkins v. L. M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1lth Cir. 1983)
(stating that "knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered implied consent"
that would permit interception of telephone conversations under federal wiretapping statute). Moreover,
under the common law privacy tort, employees have long been protected against unreasonable searches
of their personal belongings or surveillance in traditionally private places, such as bathrooms and locker
rooms, even when on employer property. See cases cited supra notes 30-35.
73. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail,
2008 U.CHI. L. F. 121, 137 (2008).
74. Id.; see also Mayer, supra note 36.
75. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
76. Id at 352.
77. 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).
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es in the dynamics of communications and information transmission."78 In
refusing to decide the issue, the Supreme Court failed to recognize that law
is itself constitutive of what expectations of privacy are "legitimate." 79 By
finding that certain areas are worthy of protection, the law validates and
reinforces claims of privacy; by declining to do so, the law negates those
claims, further diminishing expectations of privacy.
The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Warshak80
acknowledged this constitutive role of law. It addressed the question
whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of their email stored with or received through an internet service pro-
vider, thereby triggering Fourth Amendment protections. 81 Arguing that the
Fourth Amendment "must keep pace with the inexorable march of techno-
logical progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish," the court found
that email requires "strong protection" given that it "plays an indispensable
part in the Information Age."8 2 Similarly, the concurring Justices in United
States v. Jones argued that Fourth Amendment protections should turn on
the underlying interests at stake rather than the mechanical aspects of a
search. When considering whether attaching a GPS device to a vehicle
constitutes a search, Justice Alito pointed out that the significance of the
device lay not in its attachment to the vehicle, but its use to track the de-
fendant's movements over a long period of time.83 Justice Sotomayor like-
wise emphasized that the device "generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations." 84
The approaches taken by the Warshak court and Justices Sotomayor
and Alito in Jones suggest that existing law could be interpreted in ways
78. Id. at 2629-30. Rather than risk articulating an overly broad holding concerning the existence
and extent of employee privacy expectations, the Court chose to decide the case on alternative grounds.
The Court decided that even assuming that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages, the search was reasonable because it was justified by a legitimate employer purpose. Id.
79. Established social norms now treat postal mail and telephone conversations as private in part
because the law at an earlier time extended protection to these forms of communication, thereby rein-
forcing emerging norms. See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and
the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 553, 562-68 (2007) (describing the develop-
ment of laws and norms enforcing the confidentiality of postal mail); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 141-42 (2007)
(same).
80. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
81. Id. Thus, it found that to the extent that the SCA permits government searches of stored emails
without a warrant, it is unconstitutional. Id. at 288.
82. Id. at 285-86. The Warshak court commented that "as some forms of communication begin to
diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that arise." Id. at 285.
83. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
84. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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more protective of employees' electronic privacy. Some courts have found
electronic communications protected under existing law, particularly in
cases involving employer monitoring of private email accounts or off duty
fora such as chat groups.85 Others have distinguished between an employ-
er's legitimate interests in knowing whether an employee is using electron-
ic communications for personal matters or improper purposes and its lack
of need to access the contents of those communications. 86
However, protection of employee privacy is complicated by the con-
tractual nature of the employment relationship. Many cases have concluded
that employees lack any expectation of privacy if they have been given
notice that monitoring or review of electronic communications will occur.87
Consent-based arguments should have less force when employees are given
only generic notice and the employer engages in novel forms of monitoring
and surveillance. Many employees are relatively unsophisticated users of
technology and simply may not realize its potential for tracking and storing
information about their activities.88 Moreover, employers sometimes send
85. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010); Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL
3128420 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926
(W.D. Wis. 2002); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
86. See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010) (asserting that
"employers have no need or basis to read the specific contents of personal, privileged, attorney-client
communications in order to enforce [legitimate] corporate policies"). See also Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 909 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that there were "a host of simple ways" the
employer could have met its legitimate business needs without intruding on plaintiffs' Fourth Amend-
ment rights by reading a transcript of his personal text messages), rev'd City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.
Ct. 2619 (2010). Cf Watkins v. L. M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that
employer is permitted to intercept a personal call to determine whether it was a business or personal
call, but not to learn its contents).
87. See, e.g., Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that employer's
announcement that it could inspect laptops it furnished destroyed any reasonable expectation of priva-
cy); Sporer v. UAL Corp., No. C 08-02835 JSW, 2009 WL 2761329, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009)
(finding that advance notice that a company monitors computer use diminishes employee's expectation
of privacy); Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST., 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or. Sept. 15,
2004)(holding employee had no expectation of privacy because he was warned that office computer
could be monitored); Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. CIV.A.01-3386, (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (find-
ing no reasonable expectation of privacy where employer's policy informed employees that email was
not private); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (D. Nev. 1996) (finding a diminished
expectation of privacy where users were notified that their messages would be logged). Cf Curto v.
Medical World Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH) (MLO), 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2006) (finding extent to which employer actually enforced its computer usage policy a relevant
factor in evaluating employee's expectation of privacy in computer use).
88. Employees often know enough to use computers or other electronic devices to accomplish
work-related tasks, but understand little about how those devices actually operate and the extent to
which they can collect and store information. For example, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990
A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010), the employee communicated with her attorney via email using an employer-
provided laptop computer. She believed, erroneously, that by using a personal, password-protected
account, she was ensuring the confidentiality of her communications. After her employment terminated,
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conflicting messages, maintaining an official policy against personal use of
electronic systems while tolerating or even subtly encouraging such use. 89
Nevertheless, because the employment relationship is a contractual one,
employee privacy rights are vulnerable to the claim that the employee has
consented to any intrusion.
In addition to asking whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable,
the law also weighs the employer's interest in the matter intruded upon. If
work and home are neatly separated, it is relatively simple to delineate
areas of legitimate employer concern, distinct from purely personal con-
cerns of the employee. However, as discussed supra, technological devel-
opments have heightened concerns about employee misuse of technology,
increasing employers' interests in monitoring employee communications
and activities at work. At the same time, the power of the internet has
raised fears that employees' off duty communications-postings on blogs
or Facebook-might harm the employer's interests or reputation. And so
employers are increasingly claiming an interest in knowing what employ-
ees do on their own time as well. Thus, as the boundary between work and
personal life becomes more porous, the areas of employers' legitimate con-
cern are expanding, reaching employee activities, spaces, and communica-
tions previously considered private.
The combination of these factors-the unsettled norms surrounding
new forms of electronic communication, the contractual nature of the em-
ployment relationship, and the increasing difficulty of disentangling work
and personal interests-means that current law only weakly protects em-
ployees' electronic communications from employer scrutiny.90
her former employer used forensic techniques to recover the contents of her email communications with
her attorney, which had been permanently stored on her hard drive. Similarly, in Curto v. Medical
World Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
2006), the employee believed that she had protected the privacy of her personal communications by
deleting all of her personal files and emails before returning a laptop she used to work at home to her
employer. The employer was nevertheless able to recover those files and emails later with the assistance
of forensic consultants. Gaia Bernstein argues that the concealed nature of internet monitoring "dilutes
the perception of a threat" and makes individuals less likely to take steps to protect their privacy. Gaia
Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51
VILL. L. REv. 921, 936 (2006). A similar dynamic may exist for employees who receive only a generic
warning that their computer usage is subject to monitoring.
89. In Quon, for example, the City of Ontario asserted that text messages were included in its
policy that computer messages were not private. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). Quon argued, however, that he
had been assured by a supervisor that his messages would not be audited as long as he paid any excess
usage fees. Id See also Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRI-)(MLO), 2006 WL
1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (finding that lack of enforcement of employer's computer usage
policy lulled employees into believing it would not be enforced).
90. While these factors make it more difficult to protect the privacy of employees' electronic
communications, it is possible to imagine legal regimes that are more privacy protective while also
accommodating employers' interests. For example, Israel's National Labor Court recently held that
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III. SOCIALLY VALUABLE EMPLOYEE SPEECH
At the same time that employee privacy is eroding, the law increasing-
ly seeks to encourage certain socially valuable forms of employee speech.
To a large extent, employees have no legally protected right to speak
freely. 91 Freedom of expression may be valued as an important aspect of
individual autonomy, but the workplace is not generally regarded as an
appropriate forum for unrestricted expressive activity. In managing its
business, the employer has a great deal of discretion in setting work rules,
and in some respects, the law may be growing less protective of employees
who speak up in ways that their employer does not approve. 92 Neverthe-
less, several types of employee speech have consistently been recognized to
have social value-a public significance beyond whatever benefit they may
afford to the individual speaker-and are therefore protected by law.
The first such area is collective speech. When Congress passed the
National Labor Relations Act in 1935, the core of its protections were
found in Section 7, which guaranteed the rights of workers to self-organize
and bargain collectively.93 Significantly, however, the language of Section
7 extends not just to formal collective bargaining, but to employees' right
employers can limit employee use of company email systems, but must clearly inform workers in
advance and, even with such a policy, they may not make use of personal content discovered in em-
ployees' email correspondence. The court further restricted the right of employers to monitor employ-
ees' personal email accounts, even if accessed through employer systems, and suggested policies that
might balance employee and employer interests-such as providing separate email accounts for busi-
ness and personal use, blocking access to certain sites rather than monitoring internet use, or designat-
ing times when workers could use computers for personal reasons. See Jenny David, Israel National
Labor Court Ruling Restricts Access of Employers to Worker E-Mails, 37 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. A-7
(Feb. 24, 2011).
91. Scholars have argued that employee speech interests are insufficiently protected under current
law. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101
(1995); David C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1998).
92. As an example, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410
(2006), narrowed the speech rights of public employees by holding that statements made pursuant to an
employee's official duties are not protected from employer discipline by the First Amendment. In an
earlier case, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court had similarly narrowed the rights of
public employees by excluding from First Amendment protection speech regarding personnel grievanc-
es or internal office policies. Despite rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the Court in Garcetti acknowledged
the value of whistleblowing speech. It noted that "[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct
is a matter of considerable significance," id. at 425, and pointed to various whistleblower protection
laws as providing safeguards independent of the First Amendment. Professor Richard Moberly argues
that the Garcetti Court recognized the importance of whistleblowing speech, but its decision reflected
its understanding that whistleblower protection is a matter of statutory, not constitutional, law. Richard
Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 430 (2010).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Section 7 protects a fundamental associational right, one seen as
necessary to counter the inherent inequality of bargaining power when a single employee negotiates
alone with the employer. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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"to engage in other concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection." 94
Numerous court and Board decisions have interpreted this clause to extend
protection to unorganized workers acting together, even when they have no
intention or thought of organizing a union.95 As Professor Charles Morris
explained, "[c]oncerted conduct . . . may not necessarily be intended to
achieve union organization, at least not deliberately or initially." 96 Section
7 ensures that unrepresented employees, who are often poorly informed of
their rights, need not "act at their peril when they begin informal joint dis-
cussions." 97 They might not be "looking toward group action" initially,
"[b]ut given the opportunity, group action-be it mild or assertive-might
in time evolve from that rudimentary process." 98 Thus, even preliminary
discussions among employees about wages, hours, or working conditions
"must be protected, because it is from such exchanges that agreements,
formal or informal, tacit or implicit, arise." 99 In other words, in order to
meaningfully protect employees' rights of association and self-
organization, Section 7 rights must extend to its precursors-that is, simple
speech among employees about shared workplace concerns.
Recent Board cases illustrate the continuing relevance of Section 7.
Today, "precursor speech" is far more likely to occur by electronic means.
For example, in Timekeeping Systems, Inc.,c100 the Board found the employ-
er in violation of Section 7 when it terminated an employee for circulating
an email critical of a proposed change in the company's vacation policy.
The Board found that the email clearly constituted "concerted activity" for
"mutual aid or protection" because it was intended to inform co-workers
about the effects of the proposed change and to elicit their opposition to the
policy. More recently, the Board has considered the application of Section
7 to employee speech off duty on social networking sites like Facebook.10
94. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v. Phx. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); NLRB v. Guemsey-Muskigum Electric
Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
96. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1701 (1989).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1704.
100. 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997).
101. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (12-31), Jan. 24, 2012 (updating earlier report by describing additional cases
concerning employees' use of social media and employers' social medial policies and rules); NAT'L
LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA
CASES (11-74), Aug. 18, 2011 (describing recent claims of interference with protected rights based on
employees' use of social media and Board responses). See also Melanie Trottman, Workers Claim Right
to Rant on Facebook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2011, at BI (explaining that more than 100 charges have
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In recent months, it has filed charges against employers for disciplining or
terminating employees who exchanged comments about shared workplace
concerns such as late paychecks,102 or unfair treatment by supervisors.1 03
At the same time, it has declined to pursue other charges on the grounds
that the employees' posted complaints about their employer were merely
individual gripes, rather than looking to group activity.104 Although the law
as applied to electronic communications is still developing, the Board's
pursuit of charges involving employee use of social media demonstrates its
continuing concern with protecting collective employee speech, even as
that speech moves online.
In addition to collective speech, the law recognizes the social value of
individual employee speech in numerous other contexts. In particular, as
legislatures have stepped in to regulate the workplace in various ways, they
have also created causes of action to protect individuals from retaliation for
asserting their rights under those statutes. For example, Congress has not
only forbidden discrimination in employment on the basis of protected
characteristics such as race, sex, or age; it -also prohibits employers from
retaliating against an employee who complains about such discrimina-
tion. 05 Similarly, laws that establish minimum wage and overtime entitle-
ments or require compliance with health and safety standards also protect
employees from retaliation when they speak up to assert their rights to pay,
or to a safe workplace.106 These statutory schemes establish regulatory
standards for the workplace, but rely primarily on aggrieved individuals to
enforce their rights either through private lawsuits or by triggering agency
action through their complaints. By including these anti-retaliation provi-
sions, Congress recognized that effective enforcement of its policies de-
pends upon employees having the freedom to speak up about violations.
Such speech about potential regulatory violations serves not only the indi-
vidual employee's private interest, but also society's interests in seeing its
been filed with the NLRB by employees alleging that they were terminated because of their communi-
cations on social media sites).
102. Bay Sys Tech., 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011).
103. American Medical Response of Conn., Inc., NLRB No. 34-CA-12576 (complaint issued on
Oct. 27, 2010). The case was settled before the hearing. Michelle Amber, Connecticut Company Settles
ULP Charges Prior to AIJ Hearing in Facebook Firing Case, 25 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. A-2 (Feb. 7,
2011).
104. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (12-31), Jan. 24, 2012 (explaining why several of the social media cases de-
scribed did not result in the Board filing charges against the employer); NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (11-74), Aug. 18,
2011 (same).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
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policies enforced and in learning about the efficacy of existing regula-
tion. 107
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of these anti-
retaliation provisions in achieving legislative goals.108 Noting that the pur-
pose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is to "[m]aintain[] unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms,"l 09 it explained that "Title VII
depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who are
willing to file complaints and act as witnesses."o10 The anti-retaliation pro-
vision "helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the
Act's primary objective depends." 1 The Court has similarly described the
function of the anti-retaliation provision found in the Fair Labor Standards
Act. In order to enforce FLSA's wage and hour standards, Congress chose
to rely "not upon 'continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of
payrolls,' but upon 'information and complaints received from employees
seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied."' 112 Recognizing
the crucial role played by employee speech in enforcing statutory work-
place regulations, the Court has consistently interpreted these anti-
retaliation provisions liberally.113
107. See Estlund, supra note 91, at 111 ("[P]rivate employees may provide information to the
public about how private firms operate with regard to working conditions, product safety, environmen-
tal practices, and other matters in which the society has a well-established regulatory interest.").
108. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 375, 378 (2010) (arguing that Court's underlying rationale in retaliation cases "focuses on the
notion that protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the nation's laws").
Moberly asserts that the Court recognizes that antiretaliation protections are "a law-enforcement tool
that benefits society, rather than simply []extra protection for employees provided at a cost to employ-
ers." Id. at 380.
109. Burlington-Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (quoting Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
110. Burlington-Northern, 548 U.S. at 67.
I 11. Id.
112. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (quoting Mitchell
v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
113. See, e.g., Burlington-Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 (holding that Title VII's prohibitions are not
limited to actions that affect the terms, conditions or status of employment, but extend to any retaliatory
action that a reasonable employee would find "materially adverse"); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (holding
that Title VII's protection against retaliation applied to former employees, even though the literal
statutory language mentions only "employees"); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 273 (2009) (holding that prohibition on retaliation for "opposing" any
unlawful practice protects employee who did not initiate a complaint, but reported sexually harassing
conduct by a co-worker during the employers' internal investigation); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless,
131 S.Ct. 863, 870 (concluding that employee fired because his fianc6e filed a sex discrimination
complaint against their employer is protected by Title VII antiretaliation provision) (2011); Kasten, 131
S.Ct. at 1329 (holding that antiretaliation provision in FLSA protects oral as well as written com-
plaints); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008) (holding that a federal employee may assert a
claim for retaliation under the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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Not only does the law encourage employee speech to enforce work-
place regulations, it also recognizes that employees have a critical role to
play in exposing other forms of employer wrong-doing that violate estab-
lished societal rules or norms. Initially, state courts created legal protection
for whistleblowers by extending the common law tort of wrongful dis-
charge to employees who were fired because they objected to or reported
illegal or unethical activities by their employers.11 4 As recognition spread
that employees could play an important role in exposing wrong-doing and
corruption, a variety of state and federal statutes sought to protect whistle-
blowers from retaliation." 5 Many of these statutes, however, are quite nar-
row in coverage, limiting protection to certain types of workers or certain
types of reports.116
In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,117 Congress responded to this un-
even patchwork of protections by creating broader whistleblower protec-
tions for employees of publicly traded companies. The collapse of Enron
and other corporate failures the previous year had heightened concern over
financial misconduct, while illustrating the difficulty that outside monitors
faced in detecting fraud when they had only limited information about the
complex inner workings of a firm. Many thought that corporate wrong-
doing could be more easily detected if those with inside information-
employees-were encouraged to report problems. Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley
included a number of provisions intended to encourage whistleblowing,
such as prohibiting retaliation against employees who report corporate
fraud,118 and requiring corporations to create channels for employees to
report misconduct internally.119
114. See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp.572, 580 (D.Md. 1982); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276
(W.Va. 1978).
115. For comprehensive listings of whistleblower laws, see WESTMAN & MODESITT,supra note 11;
Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J.
99 (2000).
116. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 115, at 104-05.
117. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201-7266).
118. As reported by Professor Richard Moberly, cases brought under Sarbanes-Oxley's
antiretaliation provisions have been spectacularly unsuccessful. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 65 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations].
119. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley 's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whis-
tieblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107 (2006) [hereinafter Moberly, Structural Model]. Sarbanes-Oxley
also places obligations on certain highly placed corporate actors to respond to suspected wrong-doing,
obligations which Elizabeth Tippett has argued amounts to a form of compelled whistleblowing. Eliza-
beth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance Provi-
sions ofSarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 13-15 (2007).
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In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Congress acted again to in-
crease incentives for employees to report corporate wrong-doing. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010120
strengthens the protections provided to whistleblowers under Sarbanes-
Oxley by expanding coverage of its anti-retaliation provisions and address-
ing some of its perceived shortcomings. In addition, Dodd-Frank creates a
"bounty" system that financially rewards whistleblowers who provide cer-
tain types of information regarding violations of commodities or securities
law. Although Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provisions-particularly the
bounty provisions-are controversial, the underlying assumption of the
legislation is clear: corporate wrong-doing is more likely to be detected if
employees are encouraged to speak up and report violations.
The law, then, clearly recognizes the social value of certain types of
employee speech, particularly speech that is critical of the employer. Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA protects collective speech because it is essential to
employees' rights of association and self-organization. A wide variety of
statutes regulating the workplace also protect employee speech from retali-
ation as a means of enforcing those policies. And a growing body of whis-
tieblower protections reflects the belief that employee speech plays an
important role in preventing or revealing corporate wrong-doing. Employee
speech may be valuable for other reasons as well. Some have argued for
broad employee speech protections because of the importance of self-
expression, or because of the benefits-both intrinsic and instrumental-of
employee voice and participation in workplace governance.121 These val-
ues are less consistently protected by current doctrine, but to the extent that
one believes that they are worthy of protection, they, too, will be affected
by diminished employee privacy as explored in the next section.
IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SPEECH AND PRIVACY
When considering speech in the public arena, courts and scholars have
often viewed First Amendment values to be in tension with privacy
rights.122 The focus on press freedoms in First Amendment case law em-
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173
(2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641).
121. See Estlund, supra note 91, at 106-09 (arguing for the intrinsic value of employee speech for
individual autonomy and its intrinsic and instrumental value in fostering informed self-governance in
the workplace).
122. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 13; Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the
Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1196 (1990); Harry Kalven, Jr. Privacy in Tort Law:
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Neil M. Richards,
The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 365-71 (2011); Diane L. Zimmer-
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phasizes the occasions in which the two interests conflict-for example,
when the subject of a news story asserts a tort claim against a media de-
fendant for emotional injury caused by the disclosure of private facts.123 By
contrast, in the workplace, scholars have recognized that speech and priva-
cy interests are sometimes inter-related.124 Both speech and privacy, it is
asserted, are fundamental dignitary interests-areas in which employees
ought to be allowed to exercise autonomy absent some clear business inter-
est on the part of the employer. At times these claims overlap, for example,
when an employee objects that an adverse personnel action was based on
the contents of her email or her online activities off duty. Her claim might
be framed in terms of an invasion of privacy-an unwarranted intrusion on
matters that should be protected from employer scrutiny. Alternatively, her
complaint might be cast in terms of speech rights, asserting unlawful retali-
ation because of the contents of her speech.
However, these interests do not merely overlap on occasion, for the
connection between privacy and speech goes deeper. As Professor Neil
Richards asserts, some degree of privacy is essential to free speech. He
writes, "In order to speak, it is necessary to have something to say, and the
development of ideas and beliefs often takes place best in solitary contem-
plation or collaboration with a few trusted confidants. To function effec-
tively, these processes require a measure of . . . 'intellectual privacy'."l 25
Privacy theorists have pointed out that awareness that one is observed has a
"deep effect" on the subject,126 often chilling potential speech. When as-
sessing the effects of wiretapping phone lines, a Presidential commission
once noted that "[fjear or suspicion that one's speech is being monitored
... can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice
critical and constructive ideas."l 27 Similarly, Justice Sotomayor recently
observed that awareness that one is being observed "chills associational
and expressive freedoms." 28
man, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 291,293 (1983).
123. See, e.g., Doe v. Star Telegram, 864 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
124. See, e.g., FINKIN, supra note 1, at 488-531 (discussing employee interests in association and
expression as aspects of privacy); Yamada, supra note 91, at 45 (suggesting that electronic surveillance
should be considered both a privacy and free-speech issue).
125. Richards, supra note 14, at 389.
126. Id at 403.
127. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967).
128. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also Paul
M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1651 (1999) ("when
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Surveillance not only inhibits individuals from expressing their ideas,
it also tends to warp the way in which those ideas are formed. As Julie
Cohen writes:
"the experience of being watched will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable
spectrum of belief and behavior. Pervasive monitoring of every first
move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland
and the mainstream, . . . [resulting in] a blunting and blurring of rough
edges and sharp lines."129
Pervasive monitoring thus tends to discourage the exploration of unconven-
tional or dissenting views. This monitoring might take the form of observ-
ing an individual's intellectual activities-books read, websites visited, and
the like-or of capturing his communications with others. Richards argues
that both types of intrusion threaten intellectual privacy by chilling the
exploration of new ideas. 130 Private communications, in particular, are
critical in allowing the individual to gather information, ask questions and
test out tentative conclusions free from public scrutiny.131 In the absence of
some zone of privacy for exploration and testing of new ideas, speech is
less likely to serve its function of challenging existing orthodoxies or ad-
vancing new perspectives.
Richards, Cohen, and other theorists like them are concerned with par-
ticipation in the public sphere-the kinds of speech central to truth-seeking
and democratic self-governance. One might object that the workplace is
different-it is a site for productive labor, not self-expression. And alt-
hough many have advanced a vision of democratic self-governance in the
workplace, that ideal has not been consistently embraced.132 However, one
need not accept the goal of a democratic workplace to recognize that em-
ployee speech does play an important role. As seen in Part III above, col-
lective speech, speech that enforces workplace regulation and speech that
deters wrong-doing are highly valued and explicitly protected by law. And
to that extent, observations about the necessity of privacy to make speech
rights meaningful are applicable in the workplace as well.
widespread and secret surveillance becomes the norm, the act of speaking or listening takes on a differ-
ent social meaning").
129. Cohen, supra note 14, at 1426.
130. Richards identifies four areas in which intellectual privacy is protected and nurtured. Richards,
supra note 14, at 408-25. I focus on the last two of these as most relevant to the workplace.
131. Id.at421-25.
132. Cynthia Estlund, a strong proponent of increased employee voice in the workplace, acknowl-
edges that "the ideal of workplace democracy is at best contested." Estlund, supra note 91, at 108.
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Significantly, the kinds of speech valued in the workplace are opposi-
tional.133 When workers join together to speak collectively, it is because
they are dissatisfied with some term or condition of their employment and
wish to change it. When an employee objects to sexual harassment by a
supervisor, or reports a failure to pay overtime to the Department of Labor,
she is criticizing her employer's lack of compliance with the law. And
when a whistleblower raises questions about the legality of his employer's
business practices, he may be speaking against the prevailing ethos of the
firm.
Employers generally do not like it when employees speak up in these
ways, which is precisely why the law steps in to protect these speakers
from retaliation. However, simply forbidding retaliation is not enough to
ensure that socially valued speech is actually produced.134 The employer
need not actually retaliate: employees' fear of retaliation may be enough to
discourage oppositional speech. Anti-retaliation remedies can be invoked
only after the employee has suffered discharge or discipline, and offer, at
best, the possibility of an uncertain remedy after a long delay. Moreover, as
Estlund points out, much of this speech has the characteristics of a "public
good": it may produce benefits far beyond the individual speaker, but she
alone bears the costs of speaking.135 Given the difficulties of pursing a
retaliation claim, she argues, "all but the most intrepid employees will be
deterred, or 'chilled' from speaking out in ways that might provoke the
employer's displeasure." 36
To put the point more directly, speaking out at the workplace in the
ways that the law encourages is hard. Not only is there no guarantee of
protection against retaliation at the outset, but the employee also will be
highly uncertain about the effect of her speech. For example, an employee
may wish to join with others to address a workplace concern, but prior to
speaking, she is unlikely to know if they share her concerns. Workplace
regulations can be complex, and so the employee considering complaining
about her treatment at work may not be sure that she has a valid claim. A
133. As Estlund points out, employers dislike the types of private employee speech protected by
law precisely because they "bring[] information to the public or spread[] ideas among the workforce
that may threaten the employer's chosen way of doing business." Id. at 133.
134. See id. at 132-35 (explaining why employers will retaliate and employees fail to speak, even
when retaliation if prohibited); Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 118, at 153 (concluding
that Sarbanes-Oxley fails to protect employee whistleblowers as originally intended); Moberly, Struc-
tural Model, supra note 119, at 1126-31 (explaining why anti-retaliation provisions alone are insuffi-
cient to overcome barriers to whistleblowing); Tippett, supra note 119, at 16-24 (explaining why
antiretaliation provisions are both overbroad and fail to adequately encourage whistleblowing).
135. Estlund, supra note 91, at 111.
136. Id at 135.
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potential whistleblower faces a similar dilemma. She may suspect that her
employer is engaged in financial wrong-doing, but be uncertain whether
what she has observed actually constitutes a violation of law. 137
In each of these situations, anti-retaliation provisions protect the em-
ployee after she speaks out. However, a different kind of protection-
protection from monitoring and surveillance-may be necessary before the
employee speaks. Employees may need some space to seek information, to
explore ideas and discuss concerns with others before they are ready to
speak in the ways that the law most values. In order to take concerted ac-
tion, employees may first need to coordinate their efforts by speaking pri-
vately amongst themselves. However, awareness that their employer is
monitoring their communications will likely chill those conversations.1 38 If
employees are unable to communicate about shared workplace concerns
without employer scrutiny, collective speech is unlikely ever to emerge.
Similarly, the employee who contemplates asserting her statutory rights
may need to talk to other employees or seek additional information from a
public agency or attorney. For example, she may not even realize that she is
being paid less or treated differently without talking to co-workers.1 39 The
process of consultation-in the form of private communications-may be
an important first step before an employee asserts rights legally granted her
at work.
Some measure of privacy is likely necessary to encourage the whistle-
blower as well. The obstacles to whistleblowing are well-documented in
the literature. Not only does the potential whistleblower risk employment
retaliation and the material losses that accompany it, she may also face
social ostracism by her peers and public disapproval for her "disloyalty."l 40
137. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees who provide information regarding conduct
"which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation" of certain laws listed in the statute.
Although the statute only requires a "reasonable belief," this provision has been interpreted to require
the employee to show the conduct specifically relates to securities fraud, or one of the other specific
causes of action. See, e.g., Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42 (2009).
138. See, e.g., Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for Predict-
ing Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 309 (1996) (reporting survey results suggesting
that workplace surveillance is inimical to communications among co-workers).
139. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Many employers
have policies forbidding employees from discussing how much they are paid, even though they are
illegal. See, e.g., Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 N.L.R.B. 94 (1992); Heck's, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B.
1111,1113 (1989).
140. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and
the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004);
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010); Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and
Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007).
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The whistleblower must overcome psychological barriers as well. She may
experience the cognitive dissonance of questioning the activities and mo-
tives of colleagues and superiors in an organization to which she devotes
her professional energies. As Professor Geoffrey Rapp explains, whistle-
blowing causes psychological pain because "it requires deviation from a
group." The whistleblower must "accuse members of her professional and,
oftentimes, social group of wrongdoing-something that can undermine the
employee's own identity with the group."l 41 Like the dissident speaker in
the public sphere, the potential whistleblower may require a measure of
intellectual privacy in order to overcome these psychological barriers to
dissenting.
Just as in public discourse, then, valuable workplace speech does not
often arise spontaneously and fully formed. Employees may need to com-
municate privately with others-to explore ideas and options, to consider
what they believe-before they are certain what they want to say or even
realize that they have something to say. They may need to ask questions
and seek information before they feel confident speaking out, particularly
when that speech is critical or runs contrary to the prevailing norms of the
organization. Protecting and encouraging socially valuable speech at work
thus requires protecting the precursors to speech, such as the ability to
gather information and to communicate with others privately.
One might argue that protecting employee privacy is unnecessary be-
cause the employee can avoid scrutiny simply by undertaking her intellec-
tual exploration or private communications at home. However, as discussed
in Part I, supra, the line between home and work is growing more difficult
to maintain. Employers increasingly assert an interest in their employees'
electronic communications off duty, and have sometimes used technologi-
cal tools to monitor them. In other instances, employers have used their
managerial authority over workers to discover these communications, by,
for example, requesting or requiring the disclosure of personal passwords.
In order for life away from work to be a haven for nurturing speech, greater
protections may be needed to restrict employers' ability to scrutinize their
employees' off duty activities.
Even if employees' off duty activities are protected, the importance of
privacy in nurturing valuable speech argues for some, albeit reduced, pri-
vacy protections in the workplace. The types of activities that are precur-
sors to valuable employee speech are not necessarily undertaken self-
consciously. If a worker suspects she is being discriminated against, she
141. Rapp, supra note 140, at 123.
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may seek out legal advice off duty, carefully segregating these communica-
tions from channels that could be observed by the employer. Sometimes,
however, the employee's movement toward speaking out might evolve
unexpectedly, as when an exchange with a co-worker suggests a disparity
in pay, or an off-hand complaint reveals shared concerns about working
conditions. These types of communications are most likely to occur at
work; however, constant monitoring and surveillance of employee activi-
ties can have an inhibitory effect. Thus, as in the public sphere, protecting
and encouraging valuable employee speech requires that the potential
speaker be afforded some "breathing space."142
The deep connection between privacy and speech suggests that more
is at stake in protecting employee's privacy than avoiding subjective hurt
feelings. Some courts have rejected the wrongful discharge claims of em-
ployees asserting privacy rights. They have reasoned that privacy rights are
"private" by definition and cannot be the basis for a "public" policy excep-
tion limiting an employer's power to fire at will.143 As I have argued else-
where, this semantic argument misapprehends the nature of privacy, which
reflects fundamental normative practices of a community. 144 The connec-
tion between privacy and speech highlighted here suggests another public
dimension to employee privacy. Because employee privacy plays a crucial
role in nurturing socially valued employee speech, protecting that privacy
also promotes the broader public values advanced by that speech.
CONCLUSION
Observing the contemporary workplace, one can discern two distinct
trends. On the one hand, changes in the organization of work and changes
in technology appear to be eroding employees' privacy-particularly their
ability to gather information or communicate through electronic media free
from employer scrutiny. On the other hand, certain types of employee
speech have been recognized as socially valuable and subject to increased
legal protection and encouragement. These two trends are in tension be-
cause employees' privacy and speech interests are not wholly independent
of one another. Rather, as in the public sphere, protecting socially valuable
speech may require providing some measure of privacy in order to encour-
142. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive.").
143. See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(claiming that the "right to privacy is, by its very name, a private right, not a public one" and therefore
could not be the basis for a public-policy exception to the at-will rule).
144. See, Kim, supra note 27, at 724-29.
2012]1 931
932 CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW [Vol 87:3
age the potential speaker, particularly the one who might raise a critical or
dissenting voice.
Noticing this connection between employee privacy and speech does
not solve the difficult challenges of balancing employees' privacy and em-
ployers' managerial interests. It does, however, suggest that these two in-
terests are not the only ones at stake. Diminished employee privacy has an
impact beyond the affected individual, because it undermines the law's
efforts to protect and encourage socially valuable forms of speech. Recog-
nizing this fact may affect how the competing interests are weighed. If
employee privacy is viewed as protecting only the subjective hurt feelings
of the employee, it is too easily outweighed by an employer's asserted
business interests. By contrast, understanding the role that privacy plays in
fostering valuable employee speech adds some heft to the privacy side of
the balance.
